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Abstract 
An Electronic Health Record (EHR) system must 
enable efficient availability of meaningful, 
accurate and complete data to assist improved 
clinical administration through the development, 
implementation and optimisation of clinical 
pathways. Therefore data integrity is the driving 
force in EHR systems and is an essential aspect of 
service delivery at all levels.  However, preserving 
data integrity in EHR systems has become a major 
problem because of its consequences in promoting 
high standards of patient care. In this paper, we 
review and address the impact of data integrity of 
the use of EHR system and its associated issues. 
We determine and analyse three phases of data 
integrity of an EHR system. Finally, we also 
present an appropriate method to preserve the 
integrity in EHR systems. To analyse and evaluate 
the data integrity, one of the major clinical systems 
in Australia is considered. This will demonstrate 
the impact on quality and safety of patient care. 
 
Categories and Subject Descriptions 
Data integrity, healthcare. 
 
General Terms 
Data integrity, healthcare, EHR, EMR, PCEHR. 
 
1. Introduction 
Today, more than ever, organisations realise the 
importance of data quality [1] because of the 
introduction of increased reliance upon networked 
data. However one of the serious problems in 
depending on networked data is ‘dirty data’. Dirty 
data may include incomplete, missing or 
inaccurate information.  
The concern is particularly significant in health 
care, where dirty data represents the dark side of 
the great potential offered by the adoption of 
health related IT systems. First and foremost, dirty 
data can lead to medical errors, which can kill or 
cause long-term damage to the health of patients. 
Data should be an accurate representation of its 
source. It should be reliable. Data should have 
internal consistency. Data should adhere to rules 
based on the logic of the real world. The accuracy, 
internal quality, and reliability of data are 
frequently referred as data integrity [2]. This 
means the enforcement of data integrity ensures 
the quality of the data. 
In EHR, data integrity entails the accuracy of the 
complete health record’s documentation. It 
encompasses information governance, patient 
identification and validation of authorship and 
record amendments. Furthermore the quality of 
data contained in an EHR is dependent on accurate 
information at the point of capture – the data 
source. For example, the Table1 shows the 
potential EHR risks and how these risks impact 
data integrity in healthcare.  
As Table 1 exemplifies, while a primary goal of 
EHR implementation is the reduction of medical 
errors, reports of new types of errors directly 
related to EHR implementation that can 
compromise quality of care and patient safety have 
emerged [5]. 
Inaccurate health information may adversely 
affect the quality of an individual’s healthcare. 
Maintaining the integrity and completeness of 
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Table 1. The importance of data integrity 
Potential EHR risk Impacting data integrity 
example 
 
Software bugs may jumble, 
delete, modify data or 
deposit it in the wrong spot 
A laboratory value may come 
back with an extra character 
inadvertently inserted. 
Software default settings A patient's treatment for cancer 
was delayed by several years 
because a setting in her 
physician's EHR system 
defaulted to an old normal Pap 
test result instead of the more 
recent abnormal results [3] 
Software internal 
programming error 
Calculations like pounds to 
kilograms or Celsius to 
Fahrenheit. 
Transcription error  A baby died from a massive drug 
overdose as a result of a 
transcription error that occurred 
when a handwritten order was 
entered into the computer 
system. However this medical 
error could have been 
prevented if automated alerts 
had been activated [4] 
Inconsistencies between 
data fields 
A structured data field may 
indicate that one pill should be 
taken twice a day, while the 
free-text filed says to take two 
pills in the morning and one pill 
in the evening  
Copying and pasting 
information 
Copying and pasting the same 
note accidentally for several 
rows may result in the same 
medication or condition 
repeated unnecessarily. 
Templates default values Templates automatically fill in 
data elements based on other 
data entries before clinicians 
complete the actual data.  
Clinical environment may 
contribute to the 
occurrence of clinical 
decision support system 
error.  
User distraction might cause 
data entry errors or 
inattentiveness to the 
information being presented by 
the decision support system.  
 
health data is paramount because the 
computerisation of health information grows and 
the scope of organisational exchange of health 
information widens into Health Information 
Exchanges (HIEs). Patient identity integrity is the 
accuracy, quality, and completeness of 
demographic data attached to or associated with an 
individual patient. This includes not only the 
accuracy and quality of the data as it relates to the 
individual, as well as the correctness of the linking 
or matching of all existing records for that 
individual within and across information systems. 
The quality of healthcare across the continuum 
depends on the integrity, reliability, and accuracy 
of health information [6,27, 36, 37, 38, 39]. 
1.1. Motivation 
With the continued advancement of electronic 
health records (EHRs), there is increasing concern 
that a potential loss of documentation integrity 
could lead to compromised patient care, care 
coordination, and quality reporting and research as 
well as fraud and abuse.  
Poor system usability including inappropriate 
EHR design gets in the way of face-to-face 
interaction with patients and health care providers 
are forced to spend more time documenting 
required health information for the EHR. Features 
such as pop-up reminders, cumbersome menus 
and poor user interfaces can make EHRs far more 
time consuming than paper charts [7].  Poor 
system interface problems also can lead to poor 
decisions. For example, a laboratory value may 
come back with an extra character inadvertently 
inserted [8].  
Inappropriate use of EHR can also result in 
potential data integrity issues. For example copy 
and paste or cloning can lead to redundant and 
inaccurate information in EHRs. Using this 
feature can cause authorship integrity issues since 
documentation cannot be tracked to the original 
source [9, 33-35]. 
The software system vendors often add 
functionalities to assist with documentation 
capture such as templates, use of standard phrases 
and paragraphs and automatic object insertion to 
improve efficiency of data capture, timelines, 
legibility, consistency and completeness of 
documentation. However, when used 
inappropriately, without proper education and 
controls, these features can lead to inaccurate 
documentation and potentially result in medical 
errors or allegations of fraud. For example, clinical 
values brought in from other parts of the electronic 
record [10, 30-32]. 
Although EHR related errors and their actual 
and potential impact on the quality of care and 
patient safety have been documented for years, 
more research still needs to be done to measure the 
occurrence of these errors and determine the 
causes to implement solutions. 
 
1.2. Our Contribution  
In this paper, we review the literature of the data 
integrity in EHR systems (Section 2). In Section 3, 
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we determine and analyse interrelated phases of 
data integrity of the EHR systems and examine the 
impact of data integrity in each phase. We propose 
an appropriate method to preserve the data 
integrity to reduce the EHR related issues and 
potential risks in Section 4 and finally Section 5 
concludes and suggests future research 
opportunities. 
 
2. Related work 
While much has been written about EHR-
associated risks impacting information integrity 
and the subsequent actual and potential impacts on 
quality of care and safety over at least the past 
decade, little has been done to systematically 
measure and analyse these risks, identify the root 
causes, and universally implement strategies (such 
as system design modifications and adoption of 
usability principles) to reduce the risks. However, 
attention to the potential unintended consequences 
of electronic documentation is growing [11,27-29, 
32, 39]. In addition to the risks to the quality and 
safety of patient care, apprehension about EHR-
associated errors may be a barrier to EHR 
adoption and use [12, 20, 21]. 
There are also no clear standards for defining, 
measuring, or analysing EHR-related errors [13]. 
The need of identifying and analysing the EHR 
related risks are paramount. There will be a 
number of risks that adversely affect the EHR 
environment. A software flaw in an EHR system 
containing hundreds or thousands of medical 
records, such as a glitch that causes an inaccurate 
recording of patients’ allergies or medications, 
could adversely affect a large number of patients 
[14, 30]. These EHR systems design flaws also 
can result from improper system use and poor 
system usability [15]. EHR system software 
vendors include copy/paste and templates 
functionalities in capturing documentation and 
these inappropriate methods lead to EHR related 
errors [16, 31, 33]. 
Inadequate user training, human errors, 
disruption of system use or use of the system in 
ways not intended by the system developer can 
also be resulted errors in the EHR system. Use of 
decision support systems may lead to errors of 
omission, whereby individuals miss important 
data because the system does not prompt them to 
notice the information, or errors of commission, 
whereby individuals do what the system tells or 
allows them to do, even when it contradicts their 
training and other available information [17, 37]. 
 
3. Data integrity in EHR systems 
The integrity of the entire EHR is reliant on the 
integrity of each of the following three phases 
shown in Figure 1. The process of ensuring 
integrity to each phase would be different.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Integrity phases of EHR 
 
3.1. Integrity phase 1: Ensuring data integrity 
in Electronic Medical Record (EMR) systems 
Garbage in, garbage out.  The data recorded into 
medical records that health care providers 
recorded must be meaningful and understandable 
for other health care providers when sharing health 
information. Otherwise it will not be useful for 
other healthcare providers who access those 
records when it is necessary. Providing the right 
information, at the right time for the right patient 
to deliver better health outcomes, must ensure the 
data integrity.   
Ensuring data integrity in this phase must be 
carried out by clinical software systems. The data 
integrity must maintain the use of medical 
terminology or international medical coding 
system rather than free text usage in clinical 
related health information including medical 
condition and medical history. The coding system 
must be an option to choose from a pre developed 
item list to prevent spelling mistakes.  The pre 
developed coding system must be linked to 
EHR 
EMR 
Uploading health 
information 
Data Mapping / 
Synchronisation 
process 
Provider 
Portal 
Downloading health 
information 
Integrity  
phase 3 
Integrity  
phase 2 
Integrity  
phase 1 
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international medical approved standards 
dictionaries and updated on a regular basis, even 
daily. The clinical systems that health care 
providers use in Australia have included this 
facility. However this is deployed as an option and 
gives alternatives to add free texts to the clinical 
related information.    
For example Figure 2 below, shows below how 
one of the major primary care provider clinical 
systems in Australia captures medical history item. 
There is always an option for clinicians to choose 
free text. The free text could lead to human errors 
or spelling mistakes and the impact might be very 
serious.    
Figure 2. Medical history data capture form 
A medical record in an EMR includes various 
medical related information of a patient. This 
information is recorded based on different types of 
data including patient’s contributions, clinical 
check-up findings, pathology and radiology 
results and other measurements. The accuracy of 
health data of a patient depends on various inputs. 
The contribution from a patient is always based on 
the situation. The healthcare providers can only 
record what a patient communicates at the time of 
the consultation. In other words, a patient can 
intentionally hide a part of, or complete 
information from healthcare providers, they can 
even provide incorrect data. This integrity concern 
cannot be resolved unless the patient comes 
forward and provides the right information.  
 
3.2. Integrity phase 2: Ensuring data integrity 
with linking right records 
The communication of health information is a 
vital part of effective healthcare. The accurate 
identification of individuals is critical in all health 
communication. Mismatching of patients with 
their records and results is a documented problem 
for the health system and a clear link has been 
established between avoidable harm to patients 
and poor medical records management [18, 28, 29]. 
As mentioned above, identifying the right 
patient at the right time with the right information 
to upload or download is an essential part in this 
phase of integrity. To achieve this object, a 
standard number (e.g. index) system must be used.  
The system is intended to assist healthcare 
providers communicate health information with 
other providers accurately, for example, by 
providing a more reliable way of referencing 
patient information electronically.  
Moreover, in EHR systems, the delivery of safe, 
effective and efficient healthcare relies on good 
communication and systems that share 
information, where subject of care can be reliably 
and consistently identified. In Australia, the 
Healthcare Identifier (HI) number system has been 
created and automatically allocated to all 
Australians who were enrolled with Medicare on 
1st July 2010 [19]. 
HI is a unique 16 digit number used to identify 
patients that helps the healthcare providers to 
ensure their personal health information is linked 
with the right person. HIs are the building block 
for the Personally Controlled Electronic Health 
Record (PCEHR) system in Australia [20].   
Medicare Australia uses the ISO7812 standard in 
order to create the HI number to every patient in 
Australia. The HI number contains, as shown in 
Figure 3 below, a single-digit Major Industry 
Identifier (MII), a six-digit Issuer Identifier 
Number (IIN), an Individual Account Identifier 
(IAI) number, and a single digit checksum based 
on the Luhn Algorithm. The MII forms the first 
part of the IIN.  
Figure 3. HI number system (Source:[21]) 
 
3.3. Integrity phase 3: Ensuring data integrity 
in EHR systems 
Improved patient care, increased patient 
participation, improved care coordination, 
improved diagnostics and patient outcomes, 
practice efficiencies and cost savings are some of 
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the major benefits of the EHRs [22]. However 
EHR over Internet will allow for the exposure of 
the records to theft and compromise. Personal 
details in the EHR including full name, date of 
birth, current address and Medicare number are 
valuable information for fraudsters to hack.  The 
EHR also leads to deliver information to criminals 
which could be used to fraudulently obtain 
prescription drugs. This could have adverse 
implications for individuals, doctors and 
pharmacists whose e-health records are 
manipulated in order to facilitate criminal 
endeavours, where the audit trail will lead back to 
legitimate users who had access to these records, 
but who were in no way responsible for their 
fraudulent manipulation [23,34]. 
In 2012,Russian hackers held a Gold Coast 
medical centre to ransom after encrypting 
thousands of patient health records [24].  It was 
not a desktop that was compromised in this 
example. It was a server which is setup with much 
more security and rarely used for casual browsing 
and email. This means the hackers had to get 
through a firewall, anti-virus scanning software 
and then administrative credentials on the server.    
Considering that recovering from a compromise 
is a non-trivial exercise, it is likely that these 
compromises persist for days or weeks, and some 
machines may remain compromised. Imagine if 
each of these computers had at least one user who 
had used it to access their PCEHR. That represents 
potentially millions of records compromised by 
online criminals.  
That there will be a broad and extensive range 
of threats must be considered and managed to 
ensure the integrity of the PCEHR. These may 
cover the central infrastructure, including core 
server databases and data processing systems; 
intermediate data storage and processing systems 
used by healthcare professionals and service 
providers, and the data transport and 
communications layers, including protocols and 
channels used for end-to-end or server-to-server 
communications [23]. 
The integrity of the information of EHR needs 
to be trusted to use the system by the healthcare 
providers to ensure the success of the initiative. 
Some healthcare providers still have concerns on 
a few integrity issues. For example, the patients 
who registered with the PCEHR have got the 
ability to hide or completely delete (NOT to 
modify) the record that their healthcare providers 
uploaded for them. This control questions the 
integrity of the health information of the patient 
and how confident that the providers can rely on 
the system to provide the health care.   
Lack of sense of shared accountability between 
system developers and users for product 
functionality of the EHR can lead to serious 
integrity issues. The department of health 
acknowledged to the Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner (OAIC) that a 
technical change had introduced a glitch into the 
system potentially allowing a handful of 
healthcare providers to access PCEHR user’s 
personal health notes without authorisation, for a 
short window of time [25]. 
 
4. Proposed model 
The proposed model focuses on integrity phase 
three. Data encryption is commonly discussed and 
recommended for the EHR by many researches in 
the past.    
We suggest pseudonymisation technique to 
protect the health information in the PCEHR. 
Adopting a pseudonym can preserve privacy. The 
sensitive data can be protected at the same time as 
allowing users access to less critical elements by 
means of a technique called pseudonymisation. 
This process handles sensitive data by substituting 
critical data elements with pseudonyms. Using 
this technique, the information cannot be accessed 
directly – only the specific elements of the data 
relevant to an enquiry are returned to the user. The 
result of the pseudonymisation process is that, 
although users can still search data for 
relationships, that user cannot capture all the value 
of the data outside the exact context of the 
interaction, and cannot amend it in an 
unauthorized manner at all. Copying 
pseudonymised data is similarly pointless, as the 
keys connecting the valuable links between the 
accessible pseudonym and the actual data itself are 
held elsewhere. 
In the following example, Table 2 shows the 
actual data, however after the pseudonymisation 
process the sensitive data is hidden and the de-
identified information is still useful and can be 
used for research purposes.  
The hidden connective index data is stored in a 
secure destination or another PC where ordinary 
(or basic) users cannot access.    
The difference between encryption and 
pseudonymisation is; encryption or password 
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Table 2. Basic pseudonymisation technique 
Healthcare 
Identifier 
Medication  Date  Condition Name  
8001567898761234 Insulin 01-10-2014 CD John Smith 
8008123456785000 Dapotum 05-10-2014 MH Jane Doe 
8001567898761234 Thalitone 10-10-2014 CKD John Smith 
 
 
 
Healthcare 
Identifier ID 
Medication  Date  Condition Name  
0102 Insulin 01-10-2014 CD A12 
452 Dapotum 05-10-2014 MH B02 
2712 Thalitone 10-10-2014 CKD N17 
 
Table 3. Hidden index data set 
      
      
      
      
      
       
 
 
 
 
       
      
       
permission exposes sensitive data and relationship. 
However, in pseudonymisation, the sensitive data 
is hidden and the relationships are exposed. The 
two key requirements for pseudonymisation are; 
data patterns must be maintained for linkage or 
analysis and personal data that will be shared, 
either internally or with a partner, must be hidden 
during the usage.  
This will reduce risk exposure and mitigate any 
potential impact of internal and external security 
breaches. Pseudonymisation renders stolen data 
effectively useless for identity theft and other 
fraud. This facilitates secure outsourcing and off 
shoring by using de-identified data to identify 
accounts, process account documents and records 
accounts. The organizations can attain cost 
savings whilst significantly reducing the security 
concerns of using third party processors.  
The health software system integrators, 
developers and systems administrators can use de-      
identified data for estimating eHealth projects that 
work with health sensitive data, designing and 
testing new systems that source health sensitive 
data from existing operations, and maintaining 
eHealth systems that manipulate sensitive data. 
National health insurance, healthcare identifier 
and other health related number systems including 
Medicare effectively become sensitive through 
their long term usage. A good pseudonymisation 
solution can assign and maintain new pseudonyms 
for these sensitive identifiers as illustrated in 
Table 2 and 3 or even for different departments 
whilst coping with changes in these identifiers 
over time. However this is critical to business 
intelligence and other applications which deal 
frequently with historical data, in situations like 
mergers, acquisitions, and with time-related 
technical issues such as account number changes. 
5. Conclusion and future suggestion 
This paper presents three phases of integrity levels 
that require appropriate approaches to preserve 
data integrity for health in the usage of EHR 
systems. Pseudonymisation technique is proposed 
to preserve data integrity in EHR systems. With 
the introduction of pseudonymisation for the 
sensitive health information in EHR systems, 
indirect identifiable personal data is a long 
standing privacy to reduce the risks of 
identifiability. More research is needed on the 
industry-wide prevalence of each type of EHR risk 
and the impact on health record integrity, patient 
safety, and quality of care.  Further research is also 
needed on the causes of EHR-related errors and 
effective strategies for preventing and correcting 
them. 
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